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INTRODUCTION
A number of the papers in this Symposium on the impact of the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) have focused on the alloca-
tion of state and federal authority with respect to jurisdiction over na-
tionwide class actions. This Article takes a different perspective by
analyzing the role of choice of law in selecting a forum to hear a class
action and the effect of choice of law on interstate forum shopping in
nationwide class litigation. CAFA does not address the choice of law
question, and thus interstate forum shopping is likely to continue as
plaintiffs seek a forum with an approach to choice of law that will fa-
cilitate certification of a nationwide class. Because a federal court is
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obliged to apply state choice of law rules under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Electric Manufacturing Co.,' a single state's parochial or pro-aggregation
choice of law rule may be in tension with the "neutrality" in certifica-
tion decisions that CAFA is seeking.
The first Part of this Article is an account of how courts tended to
deal with choice of law issues in class actions prior to CAFA. The sec-
ond Part addresses two normative questions: (1) whether aggregate
litigation justifies a choice of law rule other than what would be called
for if the case were proceeding as an individual litigation; and (2)
whether CAFA calls for a departure from Klaxon and the development
of an independent federal choice of law rule. This Article suggests
that a federal choice of law rule, rather than strict adherence to
Klaxon, will better achieve the objectives of CAFA, so long as the con-
tent of that federal choice rule is no different than the choice of law
rule that would apply in an individual litigation.
I. THE DESCRIPTIVE STORY
A. Choice of Law in Class Actions: Some Basic Background
Choice of law issues have often taken a back seat to other impor-
tant issues in civil litigation. But a sea change occurred with the
growth of nationwide class action litigation where choice of law issues
were central to the basic issue of certification of the class.2 Choice of
law analysis gained new prominence because attempts to structure na-
tionwide classes involving state law claims-such as damage actions for
consumer fraud or misrepresentation, overcharges in contract and in-
surance cases, personal injury and breach of warranty claims for defec-
tive products, punitive damage classes, and- claims for medical moni-
toring-often turn on whether the law of a single state or multiple
states is to be applied.
It should be obvious why choice of law has emerged as such a crit-
ical issue in the modem class action setting. The pre-1966 class action
was limited in its use and confined to those with a tight community of
1 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
2 See In re Simon II Litig., No. 00-5332, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25632 (E.D.N.Y. Oct.
22, 2002), modifying 211 F.R.D. 86, 178 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (illustrating the importance of
choice of law in creating a national class), vacated, 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005). For an
earlier order and opinion on choice of law, see Simon v. Philip Morris, 124 F. Supp. 2d
46, 53-78 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). For a critique of Judge Weinstein's choice of law analysis,
see Scott Fruehwald, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation: Judge Jack B. Weinstein on
Choice of Law in Mass Tort Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 323, 348-59 (2002).
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interest. The rights in such cases were 'joint, common, or secon-
dary," and accordingly were unlikely to raise issues of the application
of different laws to the members of the class. Even as to spurious
classes, where absent class members could intervene after the judg-
ment, it was unlikely that parties whose claims were based on a differ-
ent applicable law could take advantage of the classjudgment.
4
With the emergence of the Federal Rule 23(b)(3) class and its
state counterparts, a class action became appropriate when "questions
of law or fact common to members of the class predominate[d]" over
individual issues and the class action was the "superior" method of ad-
judication.5 These requirements still serve to command a level of co-
hesiveness to ensure that aggregate litigation is the superior method
of proceeding. To minimize the individual issues and the manageabil-
ity concerns of class litigation that would likely flow from the applica-
tion of multiple laws, class action plaintiffs often seek to establish ei-
ther (1) that the law on a particular question is uniform throughout
the various states of the United States; or (2) that under applicable
choice of law principles a single law can govern the controversy. De-
fendants, for their parts, are anxious to show the differences among
the various states' laws on numerous issues, such as negligence or
comparative negligence, requirements for breach of warranty and
fraud, and elements of consumer fraud statutes. Indeed, it is common
on class action certification motions for defendants to offer elaborate
surveys identifying differences among state laws with respect to various
elements of the claims in question. When that strategy is successful-
as it often is-defendants must still resist the attempt by lawyers for
the class to show that a single law-such as that of the forum or that of
the defendant's principal place of business-should apply. Similar is-
sues have arisen in the context of Rule 23(b) (2)6 class actions for de-
claratory and injunctive relief for the class as a whole where plaintiffs
3I have written elsewhere about the development of the inodern class action. See
Linda Silberman, The Vicissitudes of the American Class Action-With a Comparative Eye, 7
TUL.J. INT'L& COMP. L. 201 (1999).
4 In general, nonmutual issue preclusion will not attach if the applicable law will
be different. See, e.g., Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 689 (N.Y. 1985).
5 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). There are, of course, general requirements for class
certification that must be met under Federal Rule 23 and most state class action rules:
numerosity, common questions of law or fact, typical claims or defenses by the repre-
sentative parties, and fair and adequate representation by the named class representa-
tive. FED. R. Cv. P. 23(a).
6 FED. R. Cwv. P. 23(b) (2) (authorizing class certification where "the party oppos-
ing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class").
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hope to avoid the express requirements, such as manageability, im-
posed on Rule 23(b) (3) actions.
Choice of law has also been a factor in aggregate litigation other
than class actions. The desirability of having a single law to govern
complex and/or mass litigation is a common thread as reformers seek
to find ways to make this type of litigation more efficient. The search
for a "single law" has generated different types of proposals: a federal
products liability statute to be passed by Congress,7 the development
of federal common law in particular areas,8 legislation for multiparty
cases that included a federal choice of law rule,9 and establishing
choice of law criteria that could lead to the application of a single law
in complex litigation."' None of these ideas reached fruition. When
Congress in 2002 finally passed the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Ju-
risdiction Act, providing for federal jurisdiction (on the basis of mi-
nimal diversity) over any civil action arising from a single accident in
which at least seventy-five persons have died," it did so without any
provision on choice of law. Various bills leading up to this legislation
contained proposals for federal choice of law provisions, but each
time controversy sent the bill down to defeat. As enacted, 28 U.S.C. §
1369 provides for consolidation of individual suits and offers an alter-
native to the formal class action for the single-event mass accident.
Choice of law is not addressed in the statute, but difficult questions
about applicable law will also arise in these cases. 2 Perhaps because
7 The Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 956, 104th
Cong. (1995).
8 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 710 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
("Given a failure of the legislature and the executive, the federal courts could be ex-
pected to step in by creating federal common law to cover a national problem."); Har-
old L. Korn, Big Cases and Little Cases: Babcock in Perspective, 56 ALB. L. REV. 933, 939
(1993) ("One way out of this morass would be to have federal statutory or common law
govern such cases .... ).
9 Multiparty, MultiforumJurisdiction Act of 1989: Hearings on HR. 3406 Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration ofJustice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 1-2 (1989); see also Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal
Swamp: The Casefor Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 2 (1991).
10 See, e.g., ALI, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND
ANALYSIS § 6.01 (a) (1994) [Mass Torts].
It 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (Supp. V 2005).
See, e.g., In reAir Crash Disaster Near Chicago, III., 644 F.2d 594, 610-32 (7th Cir.
1981) (sorting out choice of law questions in a consolidated wrongful death suit where
some possible fora allowed for punitive damages and others did not). In cases trans-
ferred to Illinois (the situs of the crash) from numerous states (California, New York,
Michigan, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii), the Seventh Circuit found that application of the
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of the experience with § 1369, none of the bills that resulted in CAFA
even attempted to craft choice of law provisions for that legislation,
although there was a flurry of activity on the part of some to try to ad-
dress choice of law just as the proposed legislation reached the floor
of Congress. 1 But no specific proposal emerged, and there is no
choice of law provision in the legislation.
B. The Impact of Shutts and Klaxon
The failure of CAFA to address the choice of law questions leaves
the role for choice of law in complex litigation and class actions post-
CAFA where it has always been in these contexts: to be shaped and
developed by judges and applied in common law fashion by the
courts. Answers to two basic questions may help determine how those
rules should be shaped. The first question is relevant not only to
CAFA but to other class and nonclass aggregate litigation: does the
fact of aggregation (in a class action or other consolidated action) call
for a distinct choice of law rule that takes into account the needs pre-
sented by the multiple parties and events that characterize aggregate
litigation? The second pertains specifically to federal cases brought
under CAFA: are federal courts hearing nationwide class actions un-
der CAFA bound by Klaxon to apply state choice of law rules, or can
the federal courts depart from Klaxon and apply "federal" choice of
law rules?
different choice of law rules of the states in which each action had been filed all
pointed to using the law of Illinois, the place of injury.
1 For example, Professors Arthur Miller and Samuel Issacharoff consulted on an
amendment to require federal courts to apply the law of the state where the principal
class action defendant resides. See Legal Experts Enter Class Action Debate, Meet with Senate
Staff To Discuss Bill, 72 U.S.L.W. 2446, 2446 (Feb. 3, 2004). During the debate in the
Senate on February 9, 2005, Senator John Bingaman stated that he had "prepared an
amendment that would have reaffirmed the discretionary authority of ajudge to select
the law of one State" in order to permit "certification for large multistate consumer
class actions," but instead of formally proposing its adoption, he would lend his sup-
port to a different amendment proposed by Senator Diane Feinstein. See 151 CONG.
REC. S1157, S1167 (Daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005). Senator Feinstein's proposed floor
amendment was entitled "Choice of State Law in Interstate Class Actions" and, among
other things, would have instructed district courts: (1) not to deny class certification
on the ground that the law of more than one state would be applied; (2) to use sub-
classes wherever possible; and (3) if subclasses were impracticable, to ensure that
"plaintiffs' State laws" were applied. See id. at S1166. For further discussion of the
amendment by the proponents and the responses to it, see David Marcus, Erie, the
Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1247, 1308-10 (2007).
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The pressure for, and subsequent resistance to, a single choice of
law rule due solely to the aggregate nature of the litigation was pre-
sented to the Supreme Court of the United States in Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts.14 In Shutts, the Kansas Supreme Court had found that in
a nationwide class action where procedural due process guarantees of
notice and adequate representation were met, "the law of the forum
should be applied unless compelling reasons exist for applying a dif-
ferent law."'' 5 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that it was
unconstitutional for the Kansas courts to proceed in this fashion when
Kansas had no basis for applying its law to the overwhelming majority
of class members who resided outside of Kansas and had leases out-
side of Kansas. 16 In addition, the Supreme Court went even further to
caution that a court's adjudication of a nationwide class action did not
provide an "added weight in the scale when considering the permissi-
ble constitutional limits on choice of substantive law."' 7 One may
nonetheless remain skeptical about the impact of the Supreme
Court's ruling in Shutts, since on remand the Kansas court determined
that the law of the various states was in fact the same as Kansas law,'
and in a related case, the Supreme Court refused to second-guess the
state court's analysis of the substance of the sister state's law. Still, as
a formal matter, the choice of law resolution in Shutts has important
consequences for class certification. Notwithstanding its recognition
of constitutional limits on choice of law in Shutts, the Supreme Court
did not dictate to either the state courts or the lower federal courts
what choice of law principles should be adopted in class actions or in
any other type of case.
Under Klaxon, of course, the federal courts have been bound to
apply the choice of law rules of the state in which they sit. And al-
14 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
15 Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 679 P.2d 1159, 1181 (Kan. 1984).
16 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 822.
17 Id. at 821.
18 Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 732 P.2d 1286, 1292 (Kan. 1987).
I9 The argument that Kansas had unconstitutionally distorted the interpretation of'
other states' laws was presented to the Supreme Court in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486
U.S. 717 (1988), but the Court refused to review that aspect of the case, id. at 730-31.
Justice O'Connor dissented on that point and observed that the result was the same as
avoiding application of the law of a particular state. Id. at 744 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing). She wrote that a court could "invent a legal theory so novel or strange that the
other State has never had an opportunity to reject it; then, on the basis of nothing but
unsupported speculation, 'predict' that the other State would adopt the theory if it
had the chance." Id. at 749.
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though recently a few states have enacted statutory choice of law
20codes, state choice of law rules have generally evolved through case
law development, and the choice of law revolution has come from the
highest courts of the states. A survey of choice of law approaches re-
veals that a small minority of states still adhere to the traditional Re-22
statemen' choice of law rules, while the remainder use some blend of
contacts and interests as reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
222of Laws' and governmental-interest analysis.24 In balancing contacts
and interests, a few states express a strong presumption in favor of fo-
rum law," whereas most look for a neutral principle of preference to
resolve a "true conflict." Of course, state courts, in developing choice
of law rules, are free, subject to the constitutional limits of Shutts, to
adopt a choice of law methodology that would facilitate class certifica-
tion in nationwide class actions. However, no state supreme court has
explicitly done so, even when application of the general choice of law
principles has led to the application of multiple laws for the nation-
wide class, which in turn has resulted in denials of class certification
because of lack of commonality, predominance, or superiority.
C. The Approach of the Federal Courts (Pre-CAFA)
Prior to CAFA, most federal courts were reluctant to reformulate
choice of law rules in class actions in the absence of congressional leg-
islation or Supreme Court modification of the Klaxon rule for com-
plex cases. Indeed, even with Klaxon, the federal courts would be free
to adopt an approach to the interpretation of the requirements of
Federal Rule 23 that would put less weight on the choice of law as-
pects for certification purposes or to allocate burdens in a particular
way to make resistance to class certification more difficult. But there
has been no such movement by the federal courts; generally they have
found that applicable law is an important element with respect to the
decision whether or not to certify, and once variations in state laws are
apparent, most federal courts have imposed the burden on the plain-
20 See, e.g., LA. CRI. CODE ANN. art. 3515-3556 (2007) (originally enacted in 1991,
effective 1992).
21 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICr OF LAws (1934).
22 EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICt OF LAWs 84-98 (4th ed. 2004).
23 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1969).
24 See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 22, at 98-105.
25 Id. at 103-05.
26 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 76-97.
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tiff class to supply the relevant information to allow the court to make
an appropriate choice of law determination on the various issues.2' In
a relatively early decision, Walsh v. Ford Motor Co. (through a joint
opinion written by Judge Harry Edwards and then-Judge, now-Justice,
Ruth Ginsburg), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit focused upon potential variations in the underlying state laws
to reverse the district court's initial certification of a nationwide class
of car owners alleging various breach of warranty claims against a car
manufacturer. Noting that "[t]he Uniform Commercial Code is not
,29uniform," the court held that the burden was on the class action
plaintiffs to demonstrate that the state law variances did "not present
insuperable obstacles" to class certification . Judge Posner's opinion
in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. pointed to a number of reasons why
the Seventh Circuit, 2-1, found it necessary to overturn the district
court's certification of a nationwide class of hemophiliacs on the issue
of negligence for defects in a blood clotting product. On the choice
of law issue, he indicated that the jury was being asked to determine
negligence of the defendant "under a legal standard that does not ac-
tually exist anywhere in the world."2 2 He wrote that "[t]he common
law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice
of some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified. The voic-
es of the quasi-sovereigns that are the states of the United States
sing... with a different pitch."3  Neither the Walsh nor the Rhone-
Poulenc opinions discussed the choice of law rule they were applying.
Those courts merely acknowledged that the application of the law of
different states made satisfaction of the predominance of common
27 See Spence v. Glock, 227 F.3d 308, 310-11 (5th Cir. 2000). Indeed, that ap-
proach has been criticized by some. See, e.g., Patrick Woolley, Erie and Choice of Law
after the Class Action Fairness Act, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1723, 1741 (2006) ("Federal courts sit-
ting in diversity have ... conflat[ed] the choice-of-law burden with the certification
burden.").
28 807 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The suit was based on a federal statute, Magnu-
son-Moss, 15 U.S.C. § 2301-12, which incorporates state law on breach of warranty, so
the court was in fact using a federal choice of law rule in determining that laws of dif-
ferent states were applicable to class members' claims. Id. at 1015-16.
29 Id. at 1016 (quoting JAMESJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE (2d ed. 1980)).
30 Id. at 1017 (quoting In re Asbestos School Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1010 (3d Cir.
1986)).
31 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-1303 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing settlement pressures, choice of
law, and bifurcation as reasons for denying certification).
32 Id. at 1300.
33 Id. at 1301 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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questions and manageability requirements of Rule 23(b) (3) impossi-
ble.
The later decision of the Seventh Circuit in In re Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc. addressed the appropriate choice of law rule di-
rectly and the analysis of state laws that may be called for. In Bridge-
stone/Firestone, the district court certified two classes: one of owners of
Ford Explorer SUVs with defective tires, and one of owners of certain
models of Firestone tires, both seeking damages on breach of war-
ranty theories. Apparently recognizing that uniform law was essential
to class certification, the districtjudge determined that the applicable
state choice of law rule-that of Indiana-would point to the head-
quarters of each of the two defendants; therefore the judge found the
necessary coherence and manageability to permit certification of the
class." The Seventh Circuit reversed certification, first finding that
the appropriate choice of law rule should be no different from the
rule that would be applied in an individual case. Noting that the rele-
vant choice of law rule in Indiana called for "the law of the place
where the harm occurred" in all but "exceptional cases,, 3 6 the Court
of Appeals determined that the laws of fifty different states would ap-
ply on various issues and that a single nationwide class was unmanage-
able. 7 The court acknowledged the temptation to "alter doctrine in
order to facilitate class treatment" but admonished that 'Judges must
resist so that all parties' legal rights may be respected., 38 The court
also offered its views about the limits of efficiency when measured
against accuracy in identifying the rights of the parties under particu-
lar laws. The court reiterated the point made in Rhone-Poulenc that a
"'decentralized process of multiple trials, involving different juries,
and different standards of liability, in different jurisdictions' will yield
the information needed for accurate evaluation of mass tort claims."3 )
After Rhone-Poulenc and Bridgestone/Firestone, a number of district
courts accepted the premise that significant distinctions in state law
present a monumental barrier to class certification because of the
288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002).
31 In reBridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 503, 511-13
(S.D. Ind. 2001).
36 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d at 1016 (7th
Cir. 2002).
7 Id. at 1018.
I8 d. at 1020.
9 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293,
1299 (7th Cir. 1995)).
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Rule 23(b) (3) "predominance requirement."40 In Cole v. General Mo-
tors Corp.,4 1 where the districtjudge certified a nationwide class of Ca-
dillac car owners alleging breach of express and implied warranties
for alleged defects in the sensors that triggered the air-bag systems,
the Fifth Circuit, on an interlocutory appeal, reversed. Both the dis-
trict court and the appeals court agreed that the Louisiana conflicts
rule pointed to application of the law of the state where the vehicle
was used by its owner and where the contract of repair would be per-
42formed-the laws of all fifty-one jurisdictions. But the appeals court
rejected the view of the district court that the state laws were "virtually
the same," pointing out several of the specific differences.4 Although
the district court had acknowledged that there might be some varia-
tions in the state laws, it thought that those differences "could be ad-
dressed through subclasses and the normal course of individual trials
that take place in large litigations";44 however, the Fifth Circuit dis-
missed such a cure, stating that "[t]his is hardly the type of extensive
analysis of variations in law that is required prior to certification. 4"
Nor have courts been particularly sympathetic to allowing certifi-
cation of "issues" under Rule 23(c) (4) to avoid "predominance" and
"manageability" requirements.46 More recently, in In re General Motors
Corp. Dex-Cool Products Liability Litigation,47 the district court expressly
observed that
40 See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Dex-Cool Prods. Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. 305,
315-24 (S.D. Ill. 2007) (determining that the application of the laws of forty-seven
states defeats "predominance" and "manageability").
41 484 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 2007).
42 Id. at 724.
43 Id. at 725-30 (quoting Cole v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 01-0123, 2005 WL
1861960, at *8 (W.D. La. Aug. 4, 2005)).
44 Id. at 728.
45 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
46 That point was made explicitly in a footnote in Castano v. American Tobacco Co.,
84 F.3d 734, 746 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996):
Reading [R]ule 23(c) (4) as allowing a court to sever issues until the remain-
ing common issue predominates over the remaining individual issues would
eviscerate the predominance requirement of [R]ule 23(b)(3); the result
would be automatic certification in every case where there is a common issue,
a result that could not have been intended.
Note that the restyled Federal Rules address issue classes in a separate provision, Fed-
eral Rule 23(c)(4), whereas under the former rules the provision was Rule 23(c) (4) (A)
with 23(c) (4) (B) covering subclasses (now 23(c) (5)).
47 241 F.R.D. 305, 314 (S.D. Ill. 2007).
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where class certification is sought as to issues under Rule 23(c)(4) (A),
Rule 23(b) (3)'s requirements of predominance and manageability must
be satisfied, and class certification must be denied where those require-
ments cannot be met by reason of, for example, the difficulties involved
in attempting to apply the laws of numerous states to the questions as to
which class certification is sought.
However, a recent Second Circuit decision, In re Nassau County Strip
481Search Cases, took a different view, holding that a district court may
certify a Rule 23(c) (4) issue class even when the entire class fails the
Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement, because the language of
the rule indicates that the issues should first be identified and then the
requirements of the rule applied. The court found additional support
in the Advisory Committee Notes.45
Even without resort to "issue classes," some federal courts have
been willing to certify national class actions without too much regard
for choice of law concerns. For example, Judge Jack Weinstein certi-•. - 50
fied a nationwide punitive damages class in In re Simon II Litigation,
which was brought as a limited-fund class for punitive damages on be-
half of smokers against cigarette manufacturers.5 1 Judge Weinstein-
ostensibly applying New York choice of law rules-found that, in a
case such as this, New York substantive law should govern claims for
punitive damages for all members of the class. Judge Weinstein ex-
pressed the view that, although the highest court in New York had
''never specifically addressed how conflicts rules apply in a complex
litigation setting like the present one,"52 he ascertained a "U]udicial
preference for material justice in conflict cases., 53 He formulated this
48 461 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006).
49 Id. at 226. For more on the conflicting views with respect to "issue certification,"
compare Laura J. Hines, The Dangerous Allure of the Issue Class Action, 79 IND. L.J. 567,
586-88 (2004), arguing that a class action must meet all of the 23(b) (3) requirements
before it can be divided into issue classes, with Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action
Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475, 1499 (2005), stating that "[l]ssue[s] pro-
posed for class treatment [need only] be of 'central' importance to the disposition of
the case." Attention to the "issue class" has also been a theme in the American Law
Institute project on Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation. SeeALI, PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.02 (Tentative Draft No. 1, Apr. 7, 2008).
50 In re Simon II Litig., No. 00-5332, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25632, at *319
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2002).
51 Plaintiffs chose to bring a limited-fund class action for punitive damages and to
forego an opt-out class action for compensatory damages. See id., at *23-26; see also In re
Simon 1I Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 99-101 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated, 407 F.3d 125, 137-38
(2d Cir. 2005).
52 In re Simon It Litig, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25632, at *235.
53 Id. at *252.
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preference as an approach that would lead to the application of a sin-
gle law. Under these circumstances, he found that the facts that de-
fendants' activities had "decisive connections" to New York and two of
the defendants had their principal places of business there5 4 justified
application of New York law with respect to all of the plaintiffs' claims.
Whatever the desirability of a single law in a case like In re Simon II,
Judge Weinstein's prediction of how a New York court would apply
the Neumeier v. Kuehner principles 55 in a setting such as this raised a
number of eyebrows, and Judge Weinstein himself offered the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit some suggestions in regards to ma-
56
nageability and subclassing, should it decide to reverse him.
The possibility of subclassing has provided several courts a basis
for justifying class certification notwithstanding decisions such as
Rhone-Poulenc and Bridgestone/Firestone. For example, in Southern States
Police Benevolent Ass'n v. First Choice Armor & Equipment, Inc., involving a
class action on behalf of law enforcement officers and organizations
against manufacturers for the sale of defective armor to police de-
partments around the country, the court concluded that the twelve
jurisdictions in which warranty laws varied presented "no material
conflicts" and that "any variations in state warranty laws can be man-
aged and modified at a later stage, if necessary. '57 This approach
seems to reinvigorate the seemingly moribund approach of "certify
now and worry later"; on the other hand, the action was not completely
nationwide and the variations in the state laws may have been rela-
tively minor.58 A more strategic approach to certification was under-
taken by the plaintiffs' class action lawyers themselves in Muehlbauer v.
54 Id. at *260-63.
55 See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457-58 (N.Y. 1972). The Neumeier
rules are usually cited as reflecting the approach to choice of law taken by the New
York Court of Appeals.
56 In re Simon IILitig., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25632, at *258, *275-76. The Second
Circuit did in fact overturn Judge Weinstein's certification of the class, but the Court
of Appeals did not address the choice of law issue. The court held that the action
could not be certified as a mandatory limited fund class because the plaintiffs did not
demonstrate either the upper limit or insufficiency of the posited fund such that indi-
vidual plaintiffs would be prejudiced if left to pursue separate actions. In re Simon II
Litig., 407 F.3d 125, 138 (2d Cir. 2005).
57 241 F.R.D. 85,91 (D. Mass. 2007).
58 For an example of how subclassing may avoid choice of law difficulties in the
context of a medical monitoring class for injunctive and declaratory relief under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (2), see In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 245
F.R.D. 279, 293-94 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
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General Motors Corp.,59 where the lawyers separated the nationwide class
of purchasers and lessees of vehicles that contained defectively de-
signed braking systems into several discrete subclasses prior to the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss. In denying the defendant's motion to
dismiss, the court addressed the future issue of certification. Because
the complaint contained six counts and the class for each count was
limited to purchases in states that had similar laws, the court observed
that "[u]nder these groupings, plaintiffs do not present a single na-
tionwide class, and there is a predominance of common legal issues in
each subclass. Plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing at this early
stage that the litigants, as grouped, are governed by the same legal
rules."60
Some district courts have used the more direct approach of find-
ing that the applicable choice of law rule points to a single law, and
thereby eased certification of the class. One such case is Powers v. Ly-
coming Engines, in which a nationwide class of prior and present own-
ers of aircraft brought suit against a defendant manufacturer for al-
legedly selling defective engine crankshafts. With respect to the class
claims for unjust enrichment and breach of implied warranty, the
court applied the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and concluded
that the "significant relationship" with the parties and the transaction
was with Pennsylvania because the engines were manufactured there.62
59 431 F. Supp. 2d 847 (N.D. Il. 2006).
60 Id. at 872 (internal quotation marks omitted).
61 245 F.R.D. 226 (E.D. Pa. 2007). For another example, see Grove v. Principal
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1106-07 (S.D. Iowa 1998), which ap-
plied the law of the defendant's principal place of business to nationwide class claims
for fraud and misrepresentation in marketing of life insurance policies.
62 Powers, 245 F.R.D. at 232. The court explained its reasoning as follows:
After weighing the factors .... the balance tilts in favor of applying Pennsyl-
vania law. Pennsylvania has the most significant relationship to the transac-
tion and the parties. It is the center of the activities that gave rise to the
claims. Lycoming is a Pennsylvania manufacturer that has been sued here,
where it manufactured the crankshafts and engines. Lycoming issued service
bulletins and instructions, communicated orally and in writing about the
crankshafts and sent press releases from its headquarters in Pennsylvania, and
plans to replace crankshafts here.
On the other hand, the contacts with the plaintiffs presumably took place in
their home states where the), purchased, operate, and moor their aircraft. Yet,
considering the mobility of a plane, it could have been purchased and trans-
ported from a state other than a plaintiffs home state. Because Lycoming's
engines are part of aircraft manufactured by others, it is unlikely that the
plaintiffs purchased the aircraft in reliance on anything Lycoming may have
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The case seems to be an outlier in terms of application of Restatement
(Second) principles, although a few state courts have reached a similar
conclusion. A federal court in Minnesota, in In re St. Jude Medical,
Inc.,64 adopted similar reasoning, albeit under Minnesota's brand of
interest analysis and "better-law" approach to choice of law issues.
There, in a consumer class action filed against a Minnesota manufac-
turer of heart valves, the court applied Minnesota law to all class
members because Minnesota had "a compelling interest in redressing
wrongs committed within its borders" that was both a "moral interest
in providing redress for those who are injured" and "an economic in-
terest because when out-of-state persons are harmed by illegal actions
of Minnesota businesses, the reputations of other Minnesota busi-
nesses are also tarnished." 65 The court reasoned that the eighteen
states that had more stringent liability standards and offered greater
protection to manufacturers than did Minnesota would not have an
interest in preventing the application of a rule that would benefit
their own citizens. 66 This analysis is a perverse understanding of the
"interest analysis" approach to choice of law. 67
represented. Consequently, the place where the false representations were
received is not a factor.
Id.
Id See infra notes 87-106 and accompanying text.
64 MDL No. 01-1396, 2006 WL 2943154, at *2, *5-7 (D. Minn. Oct. 13, 2006). The
district court's certification of the class followed a remand from the Eighth Circuit that
reversed an earlier certification for failure to consider the extraterritorial application
of Minnesota statutes to a nationwide class and to conduct a thorough conflict of laws
analysis. See In re St. Jude Med., Inc., 425 F.3d 1116, 1119-21 (8th Cir. 2005). On re-
mand, the district court conducted a more traditional conflicts analysis and found that
Minnesota law should nonetheless apply. The Eighth Circuit reversed the certification
a second time on the ground that the common issues did not predominate over indi-
vidual issues. It did not address the district court's choice of law ruling. See In re St.
Jude Med., Inc., No. 06-3860, 2008 WL 942274 (8th Cir. Apr. 9, 2008).
65 In re St. Jude Med., Inc., 2006 'WL 2943154, at *6.
66 Id. The court stated that the interests of those states were "furthered through
the application of Minnesota law to their citizens because all consumer fraud laws in
the nation are designed to protect consumers to some degree." Id. Interestingly, on
appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the certification of the class because common is-
sues did not predominate, but it did not address the district court's choice of law rul-
ing. See In re St. Jude Med., Inc., 2008 WL 942274.
67 Missing from such an analysis is the fact that different state consumer fraud sta-
tutes offer different balances between the rights of consumers and protection for
manufacturers. Properly understood, "interest analysis" does not mean that the appli-
cable law is the foreign law because the foreign law benefits the residents of the state
with the competing law. A court might properly find that the more protective rule
does not apply because the defendant is not a local citizen or resident, and therefore
the state has "no interest" in the application of its rule. Alternatively, however, such a
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D. State Choice of Law Rules in Class Actions
As noted earlier, the federal courts in these class action choice of
law cases felt bound under Erie and Klaxon to adopt the choice of law
approach of the respective states in which they sat, and thus were lim-
ited as to how they might expressly shape choice of law to accommo-
date aggregate litigation. Of course, the interpretation of what the
state choice of law rules are and how they apply to particular facts
leaves the federal courts with substantial power in determining how
choice of law will affect certification. But the state courts ultimately
have the more robust role because they are in a position to adapt their
choice of law rules to facilitate class treatment if that is a desired goal.
In some early cases, trial courts in certain states hearing class actions
embraced precisely that philosophy, and, not surprisingly, class action
lawyers quickly filed suits in those jurisdictions to take advantage of
choice of law approaches that would facilitate nationwide class treatment.
Initially, the Texas state courts were one such place, but the deci-
sion of the Texas Supreme Court in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe69
made Texas a less attractive forum. In Schein, the Texas Supreme
Court decertified a nationwide class of purchasers of defective soft-
ware products, asserting breach of contract, breach of express and
implied warranties, and other claims against the dental groups that
produced and marketed the software. The trial court determined that
all of the claims could be governed by Texas law because the software
was designed and manufactured in Texas and some of the software li-
cense agreements contained choice of law provisions calling for Texas
law.7 0 The Texas intermediate court agreed with the analysis of the
trial court and held that Texas law should also apply to causes of ac-
tion other than the contractual claims because they arose out of the
parties' contractual relationships."' On appeal to the Texas Supreme
Court, the court reversed the choice of law ruling with respect to class
members who did not have choice of law clauses agreeing to be bound
by Texas law. 2 Further, the Texas Supreme Court noted that class
protective interest could be furthered when a nonresident defendant conducts busi-
ness in the state with the greater protection for that party.
( See David Marcus, supra note 13, at 1282-86 (discussing choice of law rulings by
federal judges and noting that, as a consequence of adverse rulings, "plaintiffs' lawyers
began to abandon federal courts for state fora").
69 102 S.W.3d 675 (Tex. 2002).
70 Id. at 684.
71 Id. at 687.
72 Id. at 696-97.
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members without choice of law clauses were not subject to Texas law
merely because the defendant was located in Texas. 3 And with re-
spect to the noncontractual claims of non-Texas plaintiffs, the Texas
Supreme Court also found that the defendant's "presence in Texas
[was] but one factor to be considered in determining the applicable
law and does not, by itself, dictate that Texas law will govern the non-
contract claims of class members in other states.'
74
A decision like Schein leads to interesting strategic choices for the
use of choice of law clauses in consumer contracts as a means to block
class litigation. Note that if the choice of law clause points to the law
of a single state-such as the seller's principal place of business-class
suits against the seller will be easier since the application of a single law
may satisfy the commonality and predominance requirements neces-
sary for class certification. On the other hand, a choice of law clause
that might ostensibly seem more favorable to the consumer-e.g., the
law of the state where the consumer resides-presents the difficulty of
the application of multiple laws in class actions. Even when the law of
a single state is chosen, certain claims, such as fraud, may not fall with-
in the choice of law clause, 75 and for those claims certification may still
be improper. Other courts, such as an Illinois appellate court in Hall
v. Sprint Spectrum Ltd. Partnership,76 have been more generous in inter-
preting the scope of a choice of law clause. In Hall, the court affirmed
the certification of a nationwide class of cell phone users who brought
both contract and fraud claims challenging Sprint's early termination
fees; the court found that the provision in the contract stating that the
agreement was "governed by the law of Kansas" applied to both the
contract and fraud claims."
Class action suits without the broad array of claims asserted in
Schein may still find favor with Texas's or another state's supreme
court. To that end, plaintiffs often attempt to limit the class claims to
a particular theory of recovery where there is less likely to be variation
among the state laws, or where the particular choice of law rule may
tend to point to the application of a single law. Such was the strategy
78of the class plaintiffs in Compaq Computer Corp. v. LaPray, where a na-
73 Id.
74 Id. at 697.
75 See Lewis Tree Serv., Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., No. 99-8556, 2002 WiL
31619027, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2002).
76 876 N.E.2d 1036 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
77 Id. at 1041-44.
78 135 S.W.3d 657, 661 (Tex. 2004).
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tionwide class of purchasers of personal computers alleged that the
floppy disk controllers were defective and brought claims for breach
of express warranty against the manufacturer. Both the trial and ap-
pellate court presumed that there was no real variation among the
laws in the affected jurisdictions and ruled that the class could be cer-
tified, noting that it could await trial to consider whether there was a
particular issue on which Texas law conflicted with that of another
state.7 9 The Texas Supreme Court reversed this approach of "certify
now and worry later," holding that in ruling on motions for class certi-
fication, trial courts must conduct an extensive choice of law analysis
before they can determine predominance, superiority, cohesiveness,
and even manageability. so
Note, however, that so long as one state is prepared to apply a sin-
gle law and thereby facilitate aggregation, the courts of that state will
attract litigation on behalf of the nationwide class, whether or not it is
the most appropriate forum for the litigation. This type of egregious
forum shopping is illustrated by an unreported Oklahoma case, Grider
v. Compaq Computer Corp."' Grider, which was a carbon copy (except for
a different named plaintiff) of the nationwide class action brought by
consumers complaining about defective floppy disk controllers in La-
Pray, was filed in Oklahoma while the "same" Texas class action
against Compaq was on appeal. Although a nationwide class had al-
ready been certified in Texas, the class action lawyers were concerned
about a reversal because of the earlier Texas Supreme Court decision
in Schein, and so they filed the very same action in Oklahoma, where
they hoped for a more favorable approach to choice of law. Their
concerns were justified when the Supreme Court of Texas reversed
the certification of the class in the LaPray case, indicating that Texas
law could not govern the claims of all class members and remanding
for determination of the applicable law and the effect on certification
of a national class.83 Notwithstanding the Texas Supreme Court deci-
79 Id. at 662.
8I Id. at 663.
81 No. 03-0969 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Oct. 26, 2004) (order declaring choice of law), affd,
No. 102,693 (Okla. Civ. App. Oct. 13, 2006), cert. denied, No. 102,693 (Okla. Mar. 26,
2007). Rulings on the class-certification issue and subsequent appeals in the Okla-
homa courts can be found in Compaq's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in the Su-
preme Court of the United States (on file with author).
82 That view was based on the recent Supreme Court of Oklahoma decision, Ys-
brand v. DaimlerChr-ysler Corp., 81 P.3d 618 (Okla. 2003), discussed infra note 89 and ac-
companying text.
83 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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sion that had been rendered by this time, the Oklahoma trial court
ruled that, under Oklahoma choice of law rules, the laws of Texas, as
the state of the principal place of business of the defendant, were ap-
plicable to the UCC warranty claims.8 4 The Oklahoma Appeals Court
affirmed the decision, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court denied re-
view. Whether Grider illustrates only a biased state court choice of law
ruling in order to facilitate aggregation or a more serious breach of
full faith and credit to the Texas judgment is left unanswered because
the U.S. Supreme Court denied Compaq's certiorari petition8 6
A strategy of narrowing claims to obtain application of a single law
in a nationwide class action continues to have limited success in some
contexts, both in Texas and elsewhere. In Farmers Insurance Exchange
v. Leonard,'7 a Texas appellate court approved class certification in an
action by agents against their insurance company for failure to pay
certain bonuses. The court held that California, as the principal place
of business of the defendant and the place where the bonus contracts
were administered, had the most significant interest in the case, and
thus California law could be applied to the entire class.Y8 In Ysbrand v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp.,s9 the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the cer-
tification of a nationwide class of owners of minivans, limited to
breach of warranty claims for defects in the front passenger seat air-
bags brought against the defendant rianufacturer. 9" The Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that the law of Michigan-as the principal place
of business of the defendant-was applicable to plaintiffs' warranty
claims, and therefore common questions of law predominated. 91
84 CGider, No. 03-0969 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Oct. 26, 2004).
85 Grider, No. 102,693 (Okla. Civ. App. Oct. 13, 2006).
86 Compaq Computer Corp. v. Grider, 169 L. Ed. 2d 261 (2007).
87 125 S.W.3d 55 (Tex. App. 2003).
88 Id. at 61-65. Farmers Exchange may not be good law after Compaq and Schein. See,
e.g., Nat'l W. Life Ins. Co. v. Rowe, 164 S.W.3d 389, 392-93 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam)
(reversing certification of a class where the lower court applied the law of insurance
company's principal place of business rather than the law of the insured's domicile in
an action brought by purchasers of life insurance policies alleging various claims for
tort and breach of contract, and remanding for a detailed analysis of the relevant
states' interests); Tracker Marine, L.P. v. Ogle, 108 S.W.3d 349, 356, 363 (Tex. App.
2003) (reversing certification of a nationwide class action brought on behalf of con-
sumers for misrepresentations made by a Missouri manufacturer and indicating that
states where the consumers reside have the "most significant interest" in the claims in-
volving fraud and misrepresentation).
so 81 P.3d 618 (Okla. 2003).
90 Id. at 629.
91 Id. at 624-27.
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However, as to claims for fraud and misrepresentation asserted by the
class, the court held that where class members presumably received
the representations in their home states, the applicable law was that of
each class member's home state.92 As a result, a nationwide class forS 9 3
fraud and misrepresentation was denied. In a subsequent decision,
Harvell v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,;4 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
again ruled that the law of the principal place of business of the de-
fendant was not applicable to contract and unjust enrichment claims
by a nationwide class of consumers for illegal supply charges imposed
upon them by defendants. The court noted that the appropriate law
was that of the place where each class member had the service per-
95formed.
Not all state courts have been quite so restrictive with respect to
certification of nationwide classes for fraud and misrepresentation. In
International Union of Operating Engineers Local #68 Welfare Fund v. Merck
& Co." a New Jersey appellate court upheld certification of a national
class and approved the trial court's choice of law analysis applying the
law of the defendant's principal place of business-New Jersey. The
plaintiffs were a nationwide class of third-party payors who alleged
that they had overpaid for the drug Vioxx because the defendant did
not disclose the serious health risks associated with the drug. Apply-
ing its understanding of the conflict of laws principles in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws as interpreted in NewJersey, the appel-
late court found that NewJersey's Consumer Fraud Act was directed at
deterrence and, as a result, New Jersey's contacts and interests were
the "most significant. ,
7
The approach to choice of law in International Union was inconsis-
tent with the choice of law analyses of other New Jersey courts in both
class and nonclass contexts;' a final resolution of the New Jersey ap-
92 d. at 626-27.
9I Id. at 627.
94 164 P.3d 1028, 1033-36 (Okla. 2007).
95 Id.
96 894 A.2d 1136, 1153-54 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), rev'd on other grounds,
929 A.2d 1076 (N.J. 2007).
97 Id. at 1147-48.
98 See, e.g., Rowe v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 917 A.2d 767, 772-75 (NJ. 2007)
(holding that Michigan's interest in promoting the availability of affordable prescrip-
tion medication to its citizens outweighed NewJersey's interest in deterring NewJersey
corporations from providing inadequate warnings); Deemer v. Silk City Textile Mach.
Co., 475 A.2d 648, 651-53 (NJ. StIper. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (holding that New Jersey's
deterrent interests were outweighed by compensation structure in plaintiffs home
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proach to choice of law in such cases seemed to rest with the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court once the certification issue was appealed. And al-
though the New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately reversed the class
certification for lack of "predominance" and "superiority" under the
New Jersey class action rule,9 it expressly avoided the question of
whether New Jersey's consumer fraud statute could be applied to all
class members.' 00
It is noteworthy that the lower appellate court in International Un-
ion, in applying the NewJersey Consumer Fraud Act to all members of
the nationwide class, did not formulate a specialized choice of law rule
for aggregate litigation and purported to apply the same choice of law
rule it applies in individual litigation. Most courts are unlikely to be
transparent in this regard even though judges are undoubtedly influ-
enced by the particular context that a case presents. Such "influence"
may be difficult to detect, but a recent Supreme Court of Illinois case,
Barbara's Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp.,"" identified just such an attempt to
overcome a choice of law obstacle and expressly rejected the lower
appellate court's attempt to mold choice of law rules to avoid the
problems that application of different laws presents for aggregate liti-
gation. The Illinois Appeals Court for the Fifth District had reversed a
trial court's refusal to certify a nationwide class against a California
manufacturer that had allegedly engaged in unfair business practices
to conceal that its microprocessor did not perform as represented.
0 2
Plaintiffs had alleged that the California Consumer Legal Remedies
Act and the California Unfair Competition Law applied to the claims
of all plaintiffs since the substantial part of defendant's conduct had
taken place in California. The trial court ruled that California law
could not be applied to the nationwide class because California did
not have the "most significant relationship" to the action. The appel-
state); Heindel v. Pfizer Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 364, 370-78 (D.N.J. 2004) (applying New
Jersey choice of law and rejecting application of New Jersey law as the principal place
of business of the defendant to the entire class).
9 Int'l Union, 929 A.2d at 1085-89.
100 In a footnote, the NewJersey Supreme Court stated that
[a]lthough defendant advances strong arguments in support of its appeal
from the Appellate Division's choice of law analysis, in light of our decision on
predominance and superiority, we express no view on the Appellate Division's
choice of law reasoning or the result it reached as to the applicability of our
law to all members of a nationwide class.
Id. at 1086 n.3.
101 879 N.E.2d 910, 922 (I11. 2007).
102 Barbara's Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 857 N.E.2d 717, 724 (II. App. Ct. 2006).
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late court reversed, purporting to apply the principles of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws and concluding that California, the
principal place of business of the defendant and the place where the
conduct leading to the injury occurred, had the most significant rela-
tionship to the parties and the transaction. 103 A significant aspect of
the appeals court's decision was its consideration of the litigation as a
class action. Although the court did not expressly say that it was alter-
ing Illinois choice of law principles to facilitate aggregation of the
claims in a class action, its language is revealing. Concluding that
California, as the principal place of business of the defendant Intel,
had the strongest interest in having its regulatory scheme applied to
the conduct of Intel, the court stated,
California is clearly the only state where conduct relevant to all the potential
class members occurred. California law takes on added significance when
the relevant factors stated in section 6 of the Restatement are consid-
ered. The needs of the interstate system and the basic policies of pre-
dictability and uniformity of result require one forum with one result rather
than results in 51 jurisdictions with the distinct possibility of conflicting
decisions. 04
In reversing the Illinois appellate court on the choice of law point,
the Illinois Supreme Court in Barbara's Sales criticized the lower
court's concern for "one forum with one result," and noted that
"[t] his declaration completely ignores the distinct interests of the dif-
fering states embodied in our federalist system and constitutional
precedent."1 0 5' As the Illinois Supreme Court further explained,
The goals of the "needs of the interstate system" principle are "to make
the interstate and international systems work well," to promote "harmo-
nious relations," and "to facilitate commercial intercourse between
them." The Restatement also directs courts to strive to adopt "the same
choice of law" rules reflected in other states' precedent. The application
of California law or Illinois law, as plaintiffs urge in this nationwide class,
to a citizen of Washington state who purchased his computer in Wash-
ington state does nothing to improve the harmonious relations between
the states. Thus, we are not persuaded that section 6 of the Restatement
compels us to apply California law. 106
103 Id. at 722.
104 Id. (emphases added).
105 Barbara's Sales, 879 N.E.2d at 921.
106 Id. at 922 (citations omitted).
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II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF CLASS ACTIONS AND CHOICE
OF LAW: THE NORMATIVE QUESTIONS
A. Should There Be a Specialized Choice of Law Rule for Class Actions?
Aggregate litigation presents the question as to whether this type
of litigation justifies a specialized choice of law rule designed to facili-
tate the aggregation. The answer will depend on (1) how one per-
ceives the role of choice of law in the legal system; and (2) how one
understands the function of the class action in its relationship to indi-
vidual litigation. As Professor (now Dean) Larry Kramer emphasized
in his early article, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, choice of law is
part of the set of substantive rights that a party has when asserting a
claim. 1°7 When one posits that the claims of individuals in a class ac-
tion would, in the absence of the class context, be decided under dif-
ferent laws, it is not clear why aggregation should alter that result.
Certainly as conceived by the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, the class
action was not designed, nor could it have purported, to change the
substantive rights of the parties. The reason for the class device is that
a coherence of rights and claims already exists among potential class
members, and it is the existence of those elements that makes the rep-
resentative suit appropriate. To use the class action as thejustification
for altering choice of law rules would be to put the cart before the
horse and to misunderstand the role of both class actions and choice
of law.'0 s
Judge Weinstein in the Simon II case presents a quite different
view of both choice of law and class litigation. He sees the class action
as something more than just the amalgam of individual claims and the
107 Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 549
(1996) ("Because choice of law is part of the process of defining the parties' rights, it
should not change simply because, as a matter of administrative convenience and effi-
ciency, we have combined many claims in one proceeding ... ").
108 See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure,
Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1872, 1911 (2006) [hereinafter
Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents] (noting that a choice of law rule for aggregate
litigation is problematic because it uses the aggregate nature of the action to alter sub-
stantive law); see also Richard A. Nagareda, Bootstrapping in Choice of Law After the Class
Action Fairness Act, 74 UMKC L. REv. 661 (2006); Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence
Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 189-98 (2003). But
cf ElizabethJ. Cabraser, The Manageable Nationwide Class: A Choice-of-Law Legacy of Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 74 UMKC L. REv. 543, 567 (2006) ("It is particularly im-
portant, at this juncture, that the federal courts ... recogniz[e] that the supposed
'precedents' of earlier decision [sic] denying such certification may be[,] as a matter
of procedural justice, obsolete .... ").
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class as a necessary remedial device to respond to nationwide harms;
accordingly, he believes that choice of law rules must be modified if
necessary to achieve 'justice" for the class. But justice is not an ab-
stract principle: it is in the mind of the beholder. The communities
in which the parties reside and act-the relevant state or nation-
define the applicable principles of justice for that community. Con-
flicts arise because the lawmaking bodies of different states and differ-
ent nations "see the world quite differently."'0 9 Choice of law rules-
or rules of private international law in the transnational setting-offer
a method for accommodating these principles when particular trans-
actions and events bring them into conflict. "o
Like Professor Kramer, I do not believe that courts should be in the
business of altering the choice of law rules that have been developed for
individual cases."' Certainly in the pre-CAFA era, in which Professor
Kramer wrote, I do not believe that it was for the federal courts to re-
structure the federalism values inherent in Erie and Klaxon solely be-
cause Federal Rule 23 permitted the aggregation of state law claims in
the service of efficient federal court management. And although state
choice of law rules are largely judge made, it seems to me that a similar
presumption holds for the state judiciaries as well: courts should not
view consolidation as a reason to change the applicable law that would
apply to the rights of the parties if the case or cases were proceeding as
individual litigations.1 2 The underlying principle is that aggregation
mechanisms are procedural only and offer efficient procedures for ad-
judicating the individual rights of many. 3
109 Harold P. Southerland, Sovereignty, Value Judgments, and Choice of Law, 38 BRAN-
DEIS L.J. 451, 455 (2000).
110 1 have written about these issues in a quite different context. See Linda Silber-
man & Karin Wolfe, The Importance of Private International Law for Family Issues in an Era
of Globalization: Two Case Studies-International Child Abduction and Same-Sex Unions, 32
HOFSTRA L. REv. 233, 233 (2003); Linda Silberman, Same-Sex Marriage: Refining the Con-
flict of Laws Analysis, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2195, 2197 (2005).
Professor Kramer directs his concerns largely to the federal courts, which are
bound to apply state law, including choice of law. He emphasizes that the federal
courts ought not to make independent choice of law rules or manipulate state choice
of law. He also has some advice for the state courts-that is, that they should use the
same choice of law rules in complex and ordinary cases, and not use consolidation to
change the applicable law. See Kramer, supra note 107, at 549-50.
12 There are certain nuanced aspects to this issue, such as whether the plaintiff or
the defendant has the burden of demonstrating variations in the competing state laws.
See Woolley, supra note 27, at 173941 & nn.92-103.
113 That is also the view taken by the American Law Institute. See ALI, supra note
49, § 2.05 & Reporters' Notes cmt. a ("This Section as a whole proceeds on the premise
that choice of law is a dimension of the larger inquiry into the constraints imposed by
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A more difficult question is whether legislatures (for federal
courts it would be Congress; for state courts it would be the respective
state legislatures) should readjust the substance of choice of law rules
for class actions and other types of aggregate litigation. The answer
depends on one's underlying philosophy of class actions more gener-
ally. If one subscribes to an entity model of group litigation whereby
individual interests are subordinated as a means to pursue collective
action for the entity,1 1 4 the argument for legislative reordering of
choice of law might be enhanced. However, an entity model is best
developed in an overall legislative scheme where specific tradeoffs and
reassessments of regulatory rules would be part of any reconceptual-
ized regime. 1 . The imposition of a new regime of choice of law upon
existing regulatory rules is-to borrow from a well-known metaphor in
a different choice of law context-to "put together half a donkey and
half a camel, and then ride to victory on the synthetic hybrid."
1 6
Moreover, if the inquiry is how state legislatures should view choice of
law for nationwide class actions, perhaps the question is being put to
the wrong decisionmaker. The choice of applicable law or laws in a
national class action might be more well-suited to a federal solution by
a national decision maker.1 1 7 Such a national "decision maker" did
emerge when Congress enacted CAFA, but, if anything, the legislative
history of CAFA makes clear that there was no intention of diluting the
role of applicable state substantive law in order to facilitate aggregation.
B. The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on Klaxon
Congress's recent attention to national class actions in the Class
Action Fairness Act provides a particular focus for thinking about the
role of choice of law in class litigation. Pursuant to that legislation,
federal courts, rather than state courts, have been given decision-
substantive law upon aggregation, not a matter of procedural choice akin to the deci-
sion to aggregate itself.").
114 See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 913,918-19 (1998).
11.5 Silberman, supra note 3, at 211 (suggesting that the entity model only be used
"within a particular contextual and substantive framework").
16 DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCESS 39 (1965).
117 Indeed, some might argue that choice of law rules as a whole should have been
entrusted to the U.S. Supreme Court or Congress to fulfill the role of neutral umpire
in competition among states for application of their particular rules. See Letter from
James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), reprinted in JAMES MADISON,
THE FORGING OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 184-87 (S. Padover ed., 1953), quoted in AN-
DREAS F. LOWENFELD, CONFLICT OF LAwS 377 (2d ed. 2002).
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making power over certification of most nationwide class actions. The
legislation contains no provision on choice of law," s although efforts
were made by some to that end." 9 Indeed, during the course of the
floor debate, the Senate rejected an amendment providing that the
federal courts should not deny class certification merely because the
law of more than one state would be applied.
12 °
The role for choice of law in national class actions under CAFA
(and federal class actions more generally) raises numerous complexi-
ties in a system that rejects a "national law" for choice of law generally
and for class actions specifically. A federal/national choice of law ap-
proach to all nationwide class actions-whether brought in state or
federal court-would bring uniformity to applicable law in a variety of
class action contexts and would avoid both interstate and intrastate fo-
rum shopping for favorable choice of law as a means of achieving class
certification. But the imposition of federal law upon state courts in an
area that has always been the province of state law presents almost in-
surmountable federalism objections.
A less controversial proposal might be to adopt a federal choice of
law rule for nationwide class actions that have been brought in or
removed to federal court under CAFA. If one views CAFA as
designating specific types of class actions appropriate for "national
treatment"-that is, in need of federal jurisdiction to ensure neutral
and nonparochial assessment with respect to class viability-it could
be argued that such cases are also deserving of "neutral" choice of law
rules. Indeed, if state choice of law principles themselves reflect the
kind of parochialism that CAFA was attempting to correct, 12 an anti-
18 CAFA provides for original and removal jurisdiction in federal court for class
claims based on state law whenever there is minimal diversity between any plaintiff
class member and any defendant and the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds
five million dollars. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2) (A) (Supp. V 2005). Class members are
permitted to aggregate their claims. Id. § 1332(d)(2). Any defendant has the right to
remove the action from state to federal court. Id. § 1453(b). However, the district
court will not hear the action if a substantial majority of the proposed plaintiff class are
citizens of the same state as all primary defendants. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(B). The district
court also must decline jurisdiction if a substantial majority of the plaintiff class is from
the same state as one primary defendant when the principal injuries occurred in that
state. Id. § 1332(d) (4) (A).
,9 For a discussion of these various proposals, see supra note 13.
120 151 CONG. REc. S1166 (Daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005); see also supra note 13 (discussing
various proposals).
121 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 109-14, at 62 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 58
(concluding that federal courts will not "botch these critical choice-of-law issues" as
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Klaxon rule would seem particularly appropriate. Such a rule would
prevent forum shopping among the states to achieve favorable choice
of law treatment for class actions, and because cases falling within
CAFA will usually end up in federal and not state court, the
"inequality" that a federal choice of law rule might create with respect
to a similar action in state court does not occur in this context.
22
The concept of a federal choice of law rule for cases under CAFA
is attractive, but Congress's failure to include one underscores institu-
tional concerns about whether it is proper for the courts to create
one. A direction by Congress to the federal courts that they are not
bound by state choice of law rules and should apply "federal" choice
of law rules to a question of "applicable law" would be both appropri-
ate and pragmatic. 2" The premise is that the framework for more
neutral decision making created by federal court jurisdiction for na-
tionwide class actions by CAFA should not be frustrated by parochial
state choice of law rules. It is not so much that CAFA should be read
as an implied repeal of Klaxon, 24 but rather that Klaxon need not be




some state courts have done); see also Woolley, supra note 27, at 1726-47 (questioning
whether federal jurisdiction is appropriate to correct choice of law abuses).122 ..
This may be a slight overstatement, since defendants might choose not to re-
move if a case falling within CAFA is brought in state court. Since absent class mem-
bers do not have a right to remove under CAFA, there may be some cases that meet
the requirements of CAFA that would not be removed. This would be particularly true
in settlement class actions, but in such cases choice of law as a practical matter does
not play a role. For further discussion of the impact of CAFA on absent class members,
see Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nation-
wide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035 (2008). Also, to the extent that some re-
mands under CAFA are discretionary, certain nationwide class actions would be re-
manded back to state court. But in this situation, it could be argued that when a case
does not warrant federal treatment tinder CAFA and is properly heard by the state
court, the state choice of law rule is also proper.
23 Federal common law" on choice of law already does exist in a number of ar-
eas. See, e.g., Eli Lilly Do Brasil, Ltda. v. Fed. Express-Corp., 502 F.3d 78, 80-89 (2d Cir.
2007) (liability of air carriers); Lien Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992,
997 (9th Cir. 2006) (foreign banking transactions to which a U.S. corporation is a
party).
124 See Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA's Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. PA. L.
REv. 1765, 1815 (2008).
125 But see Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 503-04 (1941) (holding that a federal
court is required to follow the state choice of law rule in a diversity action even though
the federal court was exercising nationwide service of process under the Federal Inter-
pleader Act and the state court would not have had a similar reach). However, Griffin
is not a serious obstacle because a federal choice rule there would have made federal
interpleader a device for interstate forum shopping. See RUSSELLJ. WEINTRAUB, COM-
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C. The Appropriate "Federal" Choice Rule
A proposal for a national choice of law rule for federal class ac-
tions-but with a quite different agenda than my own-has been
made by Professor Samuel Issacharoff in two recent articles.126 Profes-
sor Issacharoff argues that because nationwide class actions are the re-
sult of a national market for goods that ultimately cause national
harm, the subject is one for attention by the national legislature-
Congress.12 To the extent that Issacharoff is correct, the most appro-
priate response to his concerns is creation at the federal level of a sin-
gle national law on products liability or consumer fraud. With such a
regime, interests of consumers and of manufacturers would be de-
bated and reflected in the content of any such national law. But pre-
cisely because there has been no agreement or consensus through the
democratic process about what the "national" law should look like, at-
tempts to achieve national statutory solutions have failed.
In the absence of federal substantive law to address the liability of
actors in the national market, a federal choice of law rule might fit the
types of nationwide classes that already have been identified by CAFA
as appropriate for federal court treatment. The Klaxon rule, which
requires federal courts to follow state choice of law rules, is not an ob-
stacle since it is not required either by the Constitution or by the
Rules of Decision Act."' Klaxon's rejection of a federal choice of law
rule for federal diversity cases more generally was prompted by a pref-
erence for intrastate uniformity over interstate uniformity because in-
trastate forum shopping was perceived as the more serious and more
likely evil. Even if that were true at the time Klaxon was decided, the
world looks different today. The growth of national (and global)
markets combined with the expansion of jurisdiction over corporate
defendants gives plaintiffs a wide and almost unlimited choice as to
MENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 724-25 (5th ed. 2006). Moreover, Griffin has been
extensively criticized. See ALl, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 211-12, 402-03 (1969); Charles E. Clark, State Law in the
Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 286-88
(1946).
126 See Samuel Issacharoff, Getting Beyond Kansas, 74 UMKC L. REV. 613 (2006) [he-
reinafter Issacharoff, Getting Beyond Kansas]; Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a
World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1839 (2006) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Settled Expectations].
127 See Issacharoff, Getting Beyond Kansas, supra note 126, at 616-19; Issacharoff, Set-
tled Expectations, supra note 126, at 1870-71.
12P28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000). The Rules of Decision Act requires that the laws of
the several states apply, but never says which state law.
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the state in which they can bring a nationwide class action against a
defendant. Moreover, as noted earlier, states have adopted various
approaches to choice of law. This combination means that even a
state with no connection to the particular transaction can use its
choice of law approach to select the law or laws applicable to the
transaction. A federal choice rule for federal nationwide class actions
would have the advantage of eliminating forum shopping among the
states for favorable choice of law rules. Because CAFA has already
identified certain types of cases as justifying federal treatment-in this
context, access to a federal court-those cases would seem to be pre-
cisely the right candidates for a federal choice of law rule.
One flaw in the above analysis is the potential overinclusiveness of
the cases brought into federal court under CAFA. For example,
12 9
consider a class action in which all plaintiffs who reside in the forum
state-for example, Texas-sue over conduct engaged in by a Califor-
nia defendant. The defendant is subject to jurisdiction in Texas, and
the events in question and the plaintiffs all have strong connections
with Texas. "This is a Texas lawsuit in every respect other than the
formal citizenship of the defendant,"'13 0 but if the aggregate amount is
met, the action comes within CAFA. The plaintiff may bring the suit
in federal court in Texas, or if plaintiff sues in state court, the defen-
dant is able to remove the case to federal court. Moreover, "neither
the discretionary nor mandatory abstention provision of the Act ap-
plies" because the defendant is not a citizen of the forum state.
3 1
Thus, this is one example of a CAFA case that would not seem to call
for a national choice of law rule. 132 Nonetheless, in most cases to
which CAFA applies, a federal choice of law rule that would accom-
modate the competing interests of the various states would seem to be
appropriate.
Unfortunately, most of the proposals calling for a national choice
of law rule have no real interest in such federalism values. For exam-
ple, Professor Issacharoff seeks a specific choice of law rule for na-
tionwide class actions and argues that CAFA permits the federal courts
to "craft a sensible choice of law rule that corresponds to the identi-
19 This example is found in LINDA J. SILBERMAN, ALLAN R. STEIN & TOBIAS
BARRINGTON WOLFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THEORYAND PRACTICE 1052-53 (2d ed. 2006).
130 Id. at 1053.
:31 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (3)-(4) (Supp. V 2005)).
132 Of course, this is a case where Texas law would likely be selected as the appli-
cable law regardless of whether a state or federal choice of law rule was used.
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fled national scope of the underlying conduct."'' 33 But, as Professor
Burbank points out, such authority is completely inconsistent with the
legislative history and the effects CAFA was designed to bring about.
13 4
Moreover, Professor Issacharoff's proposed solution-of having the
law of a single state control a nationwide class-is inconsistent with
the purported emphasis on a national market. Application of the law
of the state of the principal place of business allows one state's legisla-
ture or one state's development of a common law rule to dictate the
substance of the applicable standard for the national market. In a re-
gime where state law will govern the rights and liabilities of the par-
ties, the federal choice rule should be one that continues to respect
the different substantive judgments reflected in the laws of different
states, and that considers the underlying purposes of the rules in ques-
tion and the interests of the competing states.
Interestingly, when one looks to the original Rome Conven-
tion 1'and now the proposed Rome I Regulation-that harmonizes
choice of law rules concerned with the internal market within the Eu-
ropean Community, one finds that in the case of consumer actions, it
is the law of the habitual residence of the consumer and not the law of
the principal place of business of the manufacturer that is the appli-
cable law chosen. Concededly, these European rules have been de-
veloped for individual actions and not group litigation. But they shed
some light on the kinds of choice of law rules that are developed for
groups of states concerned with a national market. None of this is to
reject the possibility that in a particular case--depending on the com-
peting substantive rules in the various states-the law of the principal
place of business of the defendant might apply. But many of those
who propose application of a "single law" for class actions have little
interest in the values of choice of law as such. The same can be said
about many of the critics of the "single law" approach.
Consider the positions taken by each side-lawyers for the class
representative and lawyers for the defendants-on these choice of law
133 See Issacharoff, Settled Expectations, supra note 126, at 1870, 1861-71.
Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and
Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1943 & n.129 (2006) ("[T]he Act does not change
the application of the Erie Doctrine, which requires federal courts to apply the sub-
stantive law dictated by applicable choice of law principles in actions arising under di-
versity jurisdiction." (quoting S. REP. No. 109-14, at 49 (2005), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,46)).
135 European Economic Community, Convention on the Law Applicable to Con-
tractual Obligations, opened for signatureJune 19, 1980, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1.
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questions in class actions. 1 6 Lawyers for the class dismiss concerns
that the law where the defendants are headquartered may be substan-
tially less favorable than the laws of other states where many-maybe
even most-of the class members reside, or that such a rule will pro-
vide an incentive to defendants to locate in states with the most favor-
able rules to defendants. Certainly in individual litigation a choice of
law rule like this would be strongly resisted by the plaintiff side who
would object that such a choice of law rule creates a "race to the bot-
tom" such that defendants would locate in such "low consumer pro-
tection" states. But lawyers for the class want to create the largest pos-
sible group of plaintiffs because their fees will be calculated on the
basis of the class-wide relief; state-wide classes more narrowly defined
and limited to claims applying similar law will be far less lucrative and
command a much smaller settlement. And it is nationwide settle-
ments that are the norm in this litigation-desired by plaintiffs, who
want a large class, and also by defendants, who want nationwide peace.
Of course, the position of defendants in the adversarial stages of the
choice of law argument is also somewhat ironic-they argue that the
law of the defendant's principal place of business ought not to be the
applicable law because the law of the plaintiffs' home states often pro-
vides plaintiffs with greater opportunity to recover against the defen-
dant. 137 One would be surprised to hear that argument from defen-
dants in an individual litigation. Needless to say, defendants' interests
are not really directed to concerns about more generous recoveries
for plaintiffs, but are shaped by an appreciation that application of
different laws to various groups of plaintiffs will make class certifica-
tion less likely.
The proposals urging application of the principal place of busi-
ness of the defendant have one objective: to ensure that nationwide
class actions do not sound the death knell for consumer and other
types of negative-value class actions. In effect, it is an attempt to craft
a choice of law rule for class litigation so that a single law can apply to
all plaintiffs' claims and satisfy the "predominance" and "superiority"
requirements of class action rules. Such a position is ironic in light of
134, See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
137 See, for example, Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Leonard, 125 S.W.3d 55 (Tex. App.
2003), where, in a breach-of-contract class action, the California-based defendant
made the argument that California law would be unfair to plaintiffs. The court noted
the irony of the defendant's position and found that the differences between the law of
California and other states were minor. Id. at 64-65. The court then affirmed certifica-
tion of the class. Id. at 71.
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the fact that one of the main purposes behind CAFA was to prevent
state courts from acting as magnet courts and deciding law for the rest
of the country. If Congress should decide that consumer fraud and
products liability claims present problems of national scope and
should be governed by a single substantive standard, then Congress
should enact federal substantive law that takes into account the na-
tional consensus about what the content of such a rule should be.
Federal legislative solutions of this kind could also provide for aggre-
gation of individual suits or offer an independent remedy, such as the
type of public action that is the model for collective litigation in many
countries in the European Union.
38
In entrusting class action litigation to the federal courts without
accompanying federal substantive law or federal choice of law princi-
ples, Congress has allowed the choice of law consequences to fall
where they may. As suggested earlier, the applicable choice of law
rule should not tilt in the direction of either enhancing or discourag-
ing class certification. In other words, a statute concerned primarily
with adjusting federal subject matter jurisdiction over class actions
should allow the choice of law rules to play out neutrally in the class
action context. At the same time, it may have been a mistake to ne-
glect the repercussions of choice of law in the enactment of CAFA.
The applicable choice of law will continue to be the rule that would
be applied by the state court in which the federal court sits. If the
states do in fact develop choice of law principles that favor aggrega-
tion or that further local interests at the expense of national ones,139 it
is not clear why a federal court in a national class action should be re-
quired to follow suit. 140 Under CAFA, the propriety of a nationwide
138 See, e.g., Harald Koch, Non-Class Group Litigation Under EU and German Law, II
DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 355, 357-58 (2001) (discussing two models of collective inter-
est representation practiced in EU member states).
13 See, e.g., Barbara's Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 857 N.E.2d 717, 722-23 (11. App. Ct.
2006) (holding that the law of the principal place of business of the defendant, Cali-
fornia, should apply in order to facilitate certification of consumer class), rev'd, 879
N.E.2d 910 (I1. 2007); Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local #68 Welfare Fund v.
Merck & Co., 894 A.2d 1136, 1148-51 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (applying the
law of the forum state, NewJersey, because it was the principal place of business of the
defendant and NewJersey's deterrent interests were more significant than the interests
of the payors' home states), rev'd on other grounds, 929 A.2d 1076 (N.J. 2007).
140 That point is developed by Professor Richard Nagareda in a recent article. Na-
gareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents, supra note 108, at 1918-22. Although, under
Klaxon, a federal court would appear to be obliged to follow the state's law, Professor
Nagareda notes that the Supreme Court, in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,
356 U.S. 525 (1958), allowed the Erie principle to be overcome in certain situations.
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class is more appropriately determined and managed by a federal (ra-
ther than state) court. A federal choice rule that balances the com-
peting policies underlying the state laws vying for application to the
particular class members and the events in question is attractive. An
independent federal choice rule would also have the advantage of
eliminating forum shopping by lawyers for the class in search of a par-
ticular state in which to bring a class action in order to take advantage
of a particular state's choice of law rules.
There are a number of possible models for developing the con-
tent of an independent federal choice of law rule. Carefully designed
choice of law rules are presented in the ALI's 1994 Complex Litiga-
tion Study;141 those rules do express a preference for application of a
single state's law, but ultimately offer a methodology consistent with
modern choice of law analysis. Moreover, rather than force a single
law upon the case, related provisions contemplate division of the ac-
tion into subgroups of claims, issues, or parties to assist in aggregating
litigation where multiple laws may apply. Suggestions from other
sources include the development of specialized rules for particular
kinds of cases, such as consumer actions. 142 In any event, any choice of
law rule that is adopted should be one that continues to respect the
different substantive judgments reflected in the laws of different states
and nations and that considers the underlying purposes of the sub-
stantive rules in question.
None of this is to say that the application of different laws to class
actions and other kinds of aggregate litigation is necessarily dispositive
of the certification issue. It may be possible in some cases to use sub-
With respect to CAFA, it is plausible that because CAFA "effectively shuts down the
state court with regard to class certification," Klaxon should bow to Congress's notion
that aggregation should not affect a substantive remedy. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its
Discontents, supra note 108, at 1921. This principle, and not federal/state forum shop-
ping, is arguably the problem that the Act aimed to remedy. Id. at 1918-22; see also
Burbank, supra note 134, at 1950-51 ("[W]here state choice of law doctrine is materi-
ally influenced by state policy reflecting a bias in favor of aggregate litigation, CAFA's
jurisdictional provisions-reflecting (most charitably) a policy to enable aggregation
decisions unaffected by that bias-may plausibly be thought, in the words of the Rules
of Decision Act, to require otherwise than that such state law applies.").
I do not think the suggestion offered by Professors Nagareda and Burbank is a
workable one because it will always be unclear when the state choice of law rule reflects
a "bias in favor of aggregate litigation." The application of a federal choice of law
norm offers a more certain and clearer solution.
141 ALl, supra note 10.
142 See, e.g., Phaedon John Kozyris, Conflicts Theory for Dummies: Apr~s le Deluge,
Where Are We on Producers Liability, 60 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1173-81 (2000).
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classes and accommodate variations in state laws. Applicable state laws
may be grouped into manageable patterns such that complications
from choice of law differences can be obviated.143 In other cases, vari-
ations in state law may be too complex, and certification should be re-
fused. But it is these management issues-and not choice of law-
where attention and reform should be directed. 144
One recent district court decision suggests that all the attention to
choice of law may have been premature. In re Pharmaceutical Industry
Average Wholesale Price Litigation145 involved two putative classes of
plaintiffs: one class of persons who made copayments for Medicare
drugs manufactured by certain defendants, and a second class of
third-party payors who made reimbursements for those drugs based
on contracts using a particular pricing standard. Plaintiffs urged that
since the inflated price was established at the respective defendants'
principal places of business, the law of each of those states should go-
vern the entire nationwide class. Defendants argued that the applica-
ble law was that of the home states of the various class members, and,
with respect to members of the Medicare class who were not reim-
bursed, the law of each state where the drug was purchased. More-
over, according to defendants, the consumer protection statutes in
these various states had quite different legal standards. The district
court judge applied Massachusetts choice of law rules to the entire
consolidated action, which included cases transferred from other
states. "C' Applying the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the court
held that "the home state of the consumer has a more significant rela-
tionship to the alleged fraud than the place of business of the defen-
dant... since state consumer protection statutes are designed to pro-
14. See In reThe Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450,
467-68 (D.NJ. 1997), affd in part, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Fruehwald, supra
note 2, at 359-60 ("The use of subclasses may not be as difficult as some commentators
andjudges claim.").
144 See, e.g., ALI, supra note 49, § 2.12 (Trial Plan for Aggregation). Although the
preliminary proposals have a definite pro-aggregation bias, they are directed to the
management of class actions and not to a reformulation of choice of law rules for ag-
gregate litigation.
145 230 F.R.D. 61 (D. Mass. 2005).
146 Id. at 82. Because the Massachusetts court was sitting as an MDL forum, there
was an open question as to whether the Massachusetts conflicts rules were appropriate
for the transferred cases. The usual rnle is that the choice of law rules of the transferor
state should apply. See Grispino v. New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co., MDL No. 1105, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25664, at *9-10 (D. Mass. May 20, 2003), affd on other grounds, 358
F.3d 16 (lst Cir. 2004).
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tect consumers rather than to regulate corporate conduct."'' a7 How-
ever, unlike the usual case where a win on choice of law by defendants
also leads to a denial of certification, the district court here offered a
much more nuanced analysis. After examining the fifty-state survey
offered by defendants to highlight the differences among state con-
sumer laws, the district court investigated the issues in each of the
proposed classes, permitted certification of a class of physician-
administered drugs, and denied certification of a class that involved
self-administered and specialty pharmacy drugs. The district judge's
observations on this point were intriguing:
[W] hile it is tempting to apply the consumer protection laws of the states
where defendants have their principal places of business to promote uni-
form results and the ease of managing a class, under the Restatement,
the laws of the home states of the consumers govern.
Having smelled victory on the choice-of-law issue, defendants expect
a knock-dead punch on their argument that the differences among the
state consumer laws are so significant that they cause individual issues to
predominate. Indeed, in a double-dare at oral argument, they waxed
that no court in the nation has successfully certified a nationwide con-
sumer class for litigation (as opposed to settlement) purposes.148
CONCLUSION
Choice of law has an important role to play in the certification of
nationwide class actions. But courts should avoid manipulating choice
of law principles to ensure aggregation. The procedural tools of ag-
gregation should not distort the underlying substantive rights of the
parties. Courts should approach choice of law as they would in the
paradigm individual case. If that analysis produces application of
multiple laws, courts should consider the management techniques
they have under their class action rules and procedures and deter-
mine whether aggregation is appropriate given that different rules of
law will apply. If choice of law is not viewed as the dispositive factor in
certification, perhaps the genuine federalism concerns that should in-
fluence the substance of choice of law rules will once again become
the focus of attention.
147 In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 230 F.R.D. at 83.
148 Id.
